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1. Introduction 
The interpretation of ‘shadow banking’ and the mapping of the shadow banking universe is the 
subject of much academic commentary1 and policy discussions.2 This is because ‘shadow banking’ is 
often used as a catch-all term to refer to financial activities and transactions that may not be subject 
to traditional realms of regulation, but the amorphous nature of the term is unsatisfactory for 
informing debates on regulatory perimeter and policy. Often, a ‘functional’ approach is suggested in 
order to understand the nature of financial activities and transactions that are lumped into the 
‘shadow banking’ category. The ‘functional’ approach focuses on the economic function3 of the 
financial activity in question, regardless of the type of institution carrying it out.  By looking at the 
economic function performed by the financial activity in question, one may better be able to 
ascertain the underlying demand and supply for such function and4 the risks that such functions give 
rise to,5 particularly whether systemic risk is implicated. The approach may also highlight the 
functional similarities and differences6 with already-regulated financial activity in order to form 
views as to the regulatory perimeter for shadow banking activities. The ‘functional’ approach to 
shadow banking is therefore a prima facie useful approach to surveying the universe of shadow 
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banking and informing the policy-making process in relation to shadow banking activities and 
transactions at national and international levels. 
This article however raises queries as to the limitations of the ‘functional’ approach, and whether 
such limitations would ultimately hamper the development of regulatory policy. In particular, we 
question whether the functional approach is too embedded in market-liberal assumptions, and gives 
rise to a ‘like-for-like’ presumption in favour of the design of regulatory methodology. Further, we 
query whether the functional approach, though conceptually promising, is subject to the legal 
arbitrage that it seeks to overcome. Nevertheless, this article does not deny the achievements made 
by adopting the ‘functional’ approach and suggests how it should be put to optimal use. 
The article begins by briefly sketching why commentators and policy-makers have endorsed a 
‘functional’ approach to understanding shadow banking. It then proceeds to examine the nature and 
origins of the functional approach in financial regulation more generally. We assess the 
achievements of the functional approach in understanding and mapping shadow banking, followed 
by exploring the limitations we perceive. We suggest that the optimal application of the functional 
approach must be stakeholder-inclusive and focused primarily on global surveillance.  Such an 
approach is therefore not frontloaded with implications for policy-making, leaving policy choices to 
be debated in open and inclusive dialogue, so that the relevant international and national 
authorities may determine their policy choices. We argue that such an approach is optimal as it is 
likely to produce more objective factual findings that are unpartisan in nature and accessible to 
many. We argue that such an approach may be regarded as part of an endeavour towards a near-
Habermasian dialogue between economy and society. Such a dialogue is desirable, and may be an 
important piece in the wider context of the political economy of financial regulation.7 
2. Why a Functional Approach to Understanding Shadow Banking? 
A number of commentators define shadow banking as credit, liquidity or maturity transformation 
activities that are carried out without recourse to emergency liquidity assistance or a public 
backstop,8 i.e. depositary bank-like activities without the usual public sector supporting 
infrastructure, and often also outside of the usual regulatory frameworks that apply to banks.9 A 
rather crude way of looking at shadow banking is to regard all non-bank financial intermediation 
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activities as ‘shadow banking’, an approach taken by the European Central Bank,10 for example, 
albeit mainly for surveillance purposes and not for the purposes of determining regulatory policy as 
such. Such an approach perhaps more than anything highlights the inadequacies of current 
regulatory approaches. The Financial Stability Board acknowledges that the existing mode of 
regulatory thinking revolves around distinguishing the banking from the non-banking sector.11 
Current regulatory approaches are often based on the label of the firm, i.e. making sectoral 
differentiations between banks, insurers and investment firms.  
Moreover, the adoption of conventional regulatory paradigms is inappropriate for understanding 
shadow banking as it is inaccurate to only view non-bank institutions as part of the shadow banking 
landscape. This seems to suggest that such institutions are conducting covert or unconventional 
activities or are not adequately regulated. On the contrary, such institutions may be regulated under 
a different label, such as investment management, but sectoral regulation may fail to accommodate 
financial innovation that firms carry out that mimick activities in another regulated sector. Further, 
many banking institutions are indeed involved in various activities that could be described as shadow 
banking. Banks achieve much credit, liquidity or maturity transformation outside of the conventional 
regulatory framework, and these activities may pose risks that are not taken into account of in those 
regulatory frameworks. Fein12 is right in pointing out that much of shadow banking is actually 
conducted by banks and hence existing regulatory labels based on sectoral differentiation do not 
provide much guidance in understanding the nature of shadow banking and implications for 
regulatory policy. The limitations in current regulatory definitions leave non-bank institutions that 
perform economically similar functions out of the regulatory perimeter for banks. Further, 
unconventional activities undertaken by banks are also arguably beyond the regulatory perimeter. 
Hence, pockets of regulatory arbitrage can be taken advantage of by financial institutions, due to 
anomalous differences in regulatory treatment.   
Shadow banking involves financial innovation, which on the one hand may be framed as serving 
genuinely useful purposes, but on the other hand may be regarded as a form of regulatory 
arbitrage.13  As such, it may be argued that existing sectoral regulation or the non-bank/bank 
distinctions are inherently unable to capture the novelty and the boundary-shifting nature of 
shadow banking activities or transactions. A functional approach to understanding shadow banking 
is necessary as the regulatory/legal understanding of banking has become obsolete and unduly 
narrow in scope. Whether or not it is purposed to overcome regulatory arbitrage, the functional 
approach reaches into the economic structures and models of financial intermediation activity to 
discern the objectives, methodology and risk profiles of innovative or alternative activity.  The 
adoption of a functional approach in understanding shadow banking transcends the limitations of 
currently fragmented regulatory approaches adopted in different jurisdictions. It may also be the 
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first step towards framing regulatory policy, but this is where we urge the exercise of caution as will 
be shortly discussed.  
For example, a functional approach to shadow banking is able to unpack the economic purposes of 
the repo market, while highlighting which aspects of the market are in the ‘shadows’- such as 
referring to characteristics like being unmonitored, unregulated (whether or not for the purposes of 
regulatory arbitrage or avoidance) and unconventional (or as an alternative or innovative means of 
achieving similar economic effects traditionally achieved via other means, usually regulated means). 
We argue that the functional approach is able to provide an objective narrative of the nature of 
shadow banking in terms of their economic and legal functions. Such analysis is also able to tease 
out the ‘shadowy’ aspects of such activities but we suggest that the functional approach should not 
be used to justify policy-making based on ‘like for like’ with reference to what is already regulated, 
an argument that will be developed in Section 4. 
We next turn to how the functional approach can be used to flesh out the nature and key attributes 
of three shadow banking areas, the rehypothecation markets (repo markets), money market funds 
and securitisation. 
2.1 A Functional Approach to Understanding Repo Markets 
In repo markets, highly liquid securities such as government debt may be used to fund short term 
borrowing by banks and other wholesale sector institutions. For example, in the overnight repo 
market, financial institutions, usually banks, enter into agreements to sell such securities to a dealer 
(likely another bank) in order to buy them back the following day at a premium. The dealer is able to 
rehypothecate the same security instrument for the same short term funding purpose, and on 
average, Singh14 reports that the same security instrument is likely to have been rehypothecated 5 
times over in the overnight repo market. Such short term funding is essentially perpetuated by 
constant use of collaterisation to meet short term liabilities, as long as the market for the underlying 
collateral remains liquid and market confidence remains stable. The repo market is an innovative 
means of meeting banks’ short term funding needs, as traditional deposit inflows may be too 
inadequate and slow to meet banks’ business demands. Such shadow banking creates short term 
credit and cash for wholesale sector purposes. But on the other hand, it circumvents the existing 
avenue of funding by deposits and thereby circumvents the regulatory framework governing 
depositary banking, which could involve meeting a reserve ratio, pre-funding deposit guarantee 
schemes and meeting microprudential regulatory standards in order to be eligible for public sector 
backstop.   
Repo markets meet the needs of demand for increased avenues of short term funding for banks,15 
by allowing banks to use safe assets to mimick a high quality backstop for cash and credit creation. In 
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this way, ‘safe assets’ perform the equivalent function of a ‘public backstop’ in the market for 
deposits. This creates a parallel funding system which is relatively unregulated, alongside the 
regulated deposit markets. It should be noted that safe assets can only perform the equivalent 
appearance of safety16 as long as the markets for them remain liquid and confident. Thus, some 
commentators are concerned that this parallel funding system is not self-sustaining, as market 
participants may look ultimately to the public backstop enjoyed by many banks, resulting in the 
creation of dangerous risk connections between the shadow and conventional funding markets.  A 
few commentators17 are of the view that the franchise value of the borrower bank, which is backed 
by the public sector backstop, remains the ultimate confidence backstop in shadow banking, even if 
on the face of it, the quality of the safe assets used as collateral by banks seem to be the equivalent 
privately created backstop in repo markets. Yet, the boundaries of ‘safe assets’ are being pushed as 
a wide range of collateral is used in repo markets including not only government securities but also 
corporate securities and securitised assets.18 Further, In tri-party repo transactions, the clearing 
banks’ role in guaranteeing and settling repo transactions is starkly supported by such implicit public 
sector ‘puts’.19  It may be argued that funding via repo markets is a way of avoiding regulatory 
compliance and cost associated with the traditional avenue of deposit funding, making regulatory 
arbitrage an important and relevant consideration in this form of shadow banking.20 That said, 
central banks themselves participate actively in repo markets, and set standards for acceptable 
collateral.  
Repo markets have become a fundamental institution of short term funding for the wholesale sector.  
Applying a functional approach to understand such markets allows us to see them as performing an 
equivalent economic function of supplying short term funding to depositary banks, using different 
legal structures and avoiding current regulatory application.  Repo markets have been unregulated, 
framed only by the established institutions of contract, property and bankruptcy law. These legal 
institutions of rights in property, legal certainty in enforcement against collateral and bankruptcy 
remoteness provide the conditions for instituting repo markets. The markets have been 
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unmonitored as being wholesale sector markets outside of the scope of regulation (which has 
hitherto targeted retail markets), and they allow unconventional activities to flourish, ie credit and 
money creation based on private ‘safe asset’ strength instead of institutional strength supported by 
regulation and the public sector ‘put’.   Adopting a functional approach to understanding the 
economic role and legal structures of repo markets, we are able to map the risks of these markets in 
order to ascertain if its unmonitored and unconventional attributes raise concerns of public interest. 
First, we need to discern the scale of such markets and whether there are risks to market stability 
and order. For example, research into the EU showed that the extent of reliance by banks on short 
term funding using repo markets for credit transformation is staggering, representing at least 79% of 
their short-term funding sources.21 Such findings may indicate the public interest importance of repo 
markets and perhaps the need for regulators to consider providing public/collective goods such as 
market order and stability via regulatory frameworks. 
Next, we need to consider whether the legal structures in private law ie contract, property and 
bankruptcy remoteness are able to support notions of market stability and order. Pistor22 argues 
that private legal structures favour individualistic actions that may undermine the collective good, 
and cause market disorder and instability. For example, the loss of market confidence in collateral 
based on securitised assets in the global financial crisis resulted in individual dealer banks asking for 
collateral top-ups. Such pressures may force borrowing banks to liquidate good assets in order to 
meet the top-up requests. Where such pressures are applied across many financial institutions, the 
collective behaviour of liquidation may create depression for market prices of assets and result in a 
downward market spiral.  The adequacy of private legal structures in sustaining important markets 
in both good and bad times needs to be questioned. 
Further, at a broader and more general level, we need to ask questions regarding the normative and 
macro-economic implications of such private credit and money creation. Is such private money 
creation, albeit limited to wholesale institutions, socially desirable, leaving aside the actual micro-
economic phenomena of supply and demand? 
The functional approach does not translate into a ‘like for like’ assumption in policy-making. We 
should not merely liken the repo markets to being functionally equivalent to traditional short-term 
funding channels for depositary banks and therefore bring on the automatic implications of applying 
depositary bank regulation to repo funding. Such an approach is inappropriate as depositary bank 
regulation, based on microprudential requirements and the public back-stop, is founded upon the 
unsecured nature of bank deposits. In secured repo funding, the relevant legal structures for 
protection of the creditor continue to play a part and should be harnessed to protect creditors while 
not triggering systemic market crashes. The functional approach acts as a key analytical tool for 
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understanding shadow banking activities that can highlight potential regulatory arbitrage, but should 
not be used as a means of merely extending existing regulatory perimeter. 
In the EU, a like-for-like approach has not been taken to regulate repo markets like deposit markets. 
Instead, policy-makers are of the view that private market monitoring should continue to be 
harnessed, while regulators monitor for future developments that may require policy adjustment. 
Hence, the new EU Regulation introduces more mandatory transparency in securities financing 
transactions for counterparties. In particular, transparency is created as to the extent of 
rehypothecation of collateral. Further, rehypothecation is now based on counter-parties’ consent, 
and such may reduce the number of times of re-use of collateral, mitigating counterparty risk as well 
as systemic risk.23 The Financial Stability Board24 has also proposed minimum haircuts to be applied 
to collateral to mitigate the risks of re-use.  
However, the EU Regulation has not engaged with more fundamental questions such as regulatory 
frameworks and powers for maintaining market stability, the need for a public backstop, or liquidity 
provider of last resort as Schwarcz25 suggests. In this case, the EU Regulation has taken the approach 
of being incremental and largely non-disruptive.  This is a political choice and not necessarily as a 
result of functionally studying the nature of repo markets. We argue that the EU Regulation may be 
an example of inadequate consideration of the full implications of a functional study into the nature 
of repo markets. In Section 5, we will explore how the functional approach to understanding shadow 
banking can be put to more optimal use in order to more powerfully inform policy-making. 
2.2 A Functional Approach to Understanding Money Market Funds 
Money market funds is another example of what may be found in the shadow banking realm. Money 
market funds (MMFs) are funds that invest in short term wholesale money market instruments such 
as short term treasury bills, certificates of deposit, municipal and corporate debt securities, which 
cannot be directly accessed by the retail market. These funds have arisen in the US due to 
regulations capping deposit interest rates,26 and they cater to the demand of savers who seek safe 
avenues with a better rate of return than bank deposits. The MMF may be regarded as a form of 
regulatory arbitrage, allowing depositors to save in a highly liquid instrument mimicking the on-
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demand liquid characteristic of deposits, while enjoying a higher rate of return. Nevertheless,  MMFs 
also cater for genuine wholesale sector demands such as institutional cash pools (i.e. institutions 
who desire a relatively safe parking place for their assets, meeting quick liquidity demands), whose 
other less favourable alternative would be uninsured deposits. The chief attraction in MMFs is the 
promise of redemption at constant net-asset value, thereby guaranteeing savers’ capital safety, and 
distinguishing MMFs from other investment funds. Hence, MMFs perform the functional equivalent 
of depositary banks’ ability to provide a full intermediation service of savers’ capital. MMFs are able 
to do so based on the perceived safety and liquidity of MMF holdings- largely government securities 
and highly liquid corporate covered bonds and repo paper. The relative safety of such instruments 
lies in their very short maturity terms.  
As long as the issuers of paper that MMFs are holding remain solvent and the markets for such 
paper remain liquid, MMFs’ mimicking of the safety and liquidity attributes of deposits would hardly 
be called into question. The backstop for MMFs’ promises is nevertheless less strong than the public 
backstop of emergency liquidity facilities and deposit guarantee for bank deposits. The key shadow 
banking implication for MMFs lies in the expectations created by MMFs in mimicking the deposit-like 
characteristics of safety and liquidity. Such expectations, if disappointed, could result in a major loss 
of market confidence and market panic. Such an episode occurred during the global financial crisis 
2007-9. During the crisis in September 2008, MMF investors were sceptical that a number of MMFs 
could actually maintain a net asset value of USD$1 and started to withdraw from the funds in droves. 
This is because a number of MMFs held Lehman Brothers’ repo paper, and the failure of Lehman on 
15 September 2008 sharply brought into question the value of such paper backed by Lehman’s 
assets as collateral.  A high profile MMF, the Reserve Primary fund, which held a substantial quantity 
of Lehman repo paper,  ‘broke the buck’ and resiled from its promise to maintain net asset value at 
USD$1.27 The fund froze redemptions and was at the peak of its crisis valued at 97 cents on the 
dollar.  
Applying a functional approach to understanding MMFs, we see that the economic function of the 
MMF is to provide liquidity intermediation and transformation through markets instead of through 
banking institutions. In a way, it could be said that under normal conditions, the MMF may be safer 
than banking institutions in providing such liquidity transformation, as MMFs do not lend long like 
banks do. They hold relatively short-term assets. The characteristics of the MMF do not necessarily 
lend it to a like-for-like comparison with bank deposits entailing the full application of bank 
prudential regulation to the MMF.28 The EU has in the early 2000s considered that MMFs could be 
classified as UCITs, ie collective retail investment funds that are available to retail investors.29 Thus, 
for MMFs that are structured as UCITs, the UCITs regime of prudential and conduct of business 
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regulation would apply. However, the MMF is not like an investment fund as, although it is a form of 
collective pooling of investors’ capital to purchase assets, the MMF makes promises of higher 
liquidity than investment funds in general, and could therefore be more susceptible to run risk than 
investment funds in general. The UCITs Directive’s provisions on fund valuations and redemption30 
that are applicable to all collective investment schemes therefore do not directly address MMFs’ 
extremely liquid promises and the guarantee of constant net asset value. In other words, the EU’s 
approach to treating some MMFs as UCITs is characteristic of the sub-optimal sectoral approach to 
understanding shadow banking discussed earlier- a form of categorisation that attempts to fit 
financial innovation into existing brackets without addressing their specific economic functions and 
risk profiles.  
A functional approach to understanding MMFs should address the particular unconventional aspects 
of MMFs as a means of financial innovation, and whether they give rise to concerns for being 
relatively unmonitored or unregulated. We need to question whether the liquidity assumptions 
made by MMFs are sound to support their business model, and whether private market monitoring 
is sufficient to ensure that MMFs can meet their liquidity promises. We need to ask if there is any 
deficit in investor protection or investor education in relation to the business model of MMFs. 
Post-crisis, reforms have been introduced in the US and EU to regulate the MMF more robustly. 
These measures, as will be discussed shortly, take different positions but are broadly in the vein of a 
like-for-like approach, framing MMFs to fit into one of the established categories of financial 
regulation.  The EU31 has taken the approach of forcing MMFs to be treated more like investment 
funds, and therefore regulated as such. MMFs are now required  to maintain a floating net-asset 
value or to erect redemption gates, therefore limited in their former ability to mimick deposit-like 
attributes, so as to manage market expectations with regard to their risks.32 In the US, a different 
approach is taken to ensure that MMFs can more robustly meet the constant net asset value and 
liquidity promises. MMFs are now more tightly regulated in terms of the types of liquid securities 
they can invest in, and would also be required to compute weekly mark-to-market ‘shadow’ fund 
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values for transparency purposes. 33  The US approach therefore tends to preserve MMFs’ deposit-
mimicking characteristics and the regulatory approach is in the vein of prudential regulation. 
Although the functional analysis of MMFs has given rise to two different responses- the EU response 
likening MMFs to investment funds and therefore extending the regulatory perimeter in that 
direction; and the US response likening MMFs to deposits and therefore extending more prudential-
like regulation in composition restrictions and risk valuation, the two regulatory approaches have 
not transcended the limitations of a like-for-like approach. This arguably hampers the potential of a 
functional analysis, as MMFs are clearly different from deposits and investment funds. MMFs are 
different from deposits because they rely on market liquidity that is not available to much of bank 
deposit transformations; and they are different from investment funds as they are not savings 
products and offer liquidity horizons that meet different wholesale needs. We argue that the 
functional analysis could be more optimally deployed to analyse the economic functions of MMFs 
and perhaps be able to inform a more suis generis  approach to regulating them where relevant. 
2.3 A Functional Approach to Understanding Securitisation 
The functional approach to understanding shadow banking can also provide the first steps to 
constructing a narrative of novel financial transactions or institutions that have no existing 
equivalents, such as securitisation which took off since the late 1990s,34 and recent developments in 
credit and investment intermediation in peer-to-peer lending and equity crowdfunding.35  
Gerding36 defines shadow banking as novel financial transactions that pool financial assets, 
restructure risks and cash streams and create new assets that theoretically achieve low risk and high 
liquidity. Such novel financial instruments are often the culmination of stages of processes in 
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financial intermediation undertaken by different intermediary institutions at each stage. This 
definition is very much based on the nature of securitisation, possibly the most innovative and 
controversial of financial innovations that have come to dominate the concept of shadow banking 
itself. The example of securitisation highlights the wide scope of shadow banking- from alternative 
means of achieving traditional economic functions in credit, liquidity or maturity transformation to 
completely new means of financial risk management and product development. 
Securitisation can be carried out at various levels of complexity37 and opacity, but put briefly, it 
involves turning traditionally illiquid assets, such as residential mortgages on banks’ loan books, into 
less risky and more liquid assets for investors in the market. This is achieved by transferring the 
illiquid assets to special purpose vehicles which then structure and package these assets into 
securities. Securitisation often involves structuring assets with tranches of varying degrees of credit 
risk, in order to improve the overall risk profile of the asset. The securities are then warehoused with 
another layer of financial intermediaries before being distributed and placed with investors. 
Securitisation achieves risk transformation of illiquid and perhaps less attractive assets into 
investible securities, at the same time generating fee income for originating lenders, and freeing up 
banks’ lending capacity and mitigating the cost of compliance with capital adequacy requirements in 
regulation.38 With the help of credit rating agencies, these novel assets are often given high credit 
ratings based on the supposed improvement in their risk profile, and are sold widely in wholesale 
markets.39 Institutional investors have been attracted to such products and so have banks in general, 
as the high credit ratings attached to such products allow them to be regarded as good collateral in 
the repo markets.  
Genuine advantages in risk management can be achieved by securitisation as credit risk can be more 
efficiently spread in the markets, and banks’ credit creating capacity for socially useful economic 
activity can be enhanced.40 However, the structuring of assets can be a complex and opaque process, 
making quality difficult to discern. The prospect of securitisation may also allow lenders to originate 
loans with less care, having a myopic focus only on the immediate fee income that can be generated 
through the bringing to market of securitised products.41  Defects in risk quality may not be detected 
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by credit rating agencies given that the structures in securitised assets may be sufficiently complex 
and opaque.  
Securitised assets involved different types of credit products such as residential mortgage loans, 
auto loans, and even types of personal unsecured loans and student loans. One popular category of 
securitised assets marketed before the global financial crisis 2007-9 was the mortgage-backed 
securities, largely based on prime and sub-prime mortgage loans originating in the US. In fact, 
securitisation was the main means by which banks would make loans to highly dubious borrowers in 
terms of credit-worthiness, as they would be purchased by Fannie Mae42 and Freddie Mac. Fannie 
was an agency that was originally formed by the post-Depression government to buy loans off banks 
so that banks could be freed to participate in economic reconstruction.  Freddie was subsequently 
created to prevent Fannie from having a monopoly in the market. The market for mortgage-backed 
securities grew to be substantial in the pre-crisis period, estimated at about USD£1 trillion.43  
The global financial crisis 2007-944 was however triggered by a collapse in market confidence in the 
value of such mortgage-backed securities, especially the more complex collaterised obligations and 
their synthetic versions, held by many financial institutions worldwide. As many mortgage backed 
securities contained tranches of subprime mortgage loans originating from the US, subprime 
mortgage defaults shook investor confidence in these securitised products whose value became 
uncertain and difficult to determine given their complex and bundled structure. Liquidity in these 
products dried up, and this affected other markets such as repos where these products are used as 
collateral. Many banks and institutions faced short term funding squeezes due to the seizure in repo 
markets and also suffered losses on their books from such asset holdings. Where collateral had to be 
realised or topped up, book losses quickly became real losses as assets were fire sold in a falling and 
increasingly illiquid market. Further, such losses had knock on effects on banks’ capital adequacy 
positions and this further exacerbated deteriorating market confidence in banks and institutions 
holding such securitised assets. As a result the US banking sector was shaken by one insolvency, 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and a few near failures were averted only because of 
government intervention that brokered private sector deals, such as Merrill Lynch, Washington 
Mutual and Bear Stearns. The UK featured a similar scenario, with government bailout of Northern 
Rock, Halifax Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland. Although these UK banks were not 
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directly affected by losses in holdings of US mortgage-backed securities, Northern Rock45 and HBOS46 
were affected by short term funding squeezes particularly because they ran highly risky business 
models relying excessively on the repo market. RBS47 was affected by the enormous holdings of US 
mortgaged-backed securities in ABN-AMRO which it acquired shortly before the crisis. 
The adverse effects of securitisation related in the global financial crisis story of 2007-9 were due to 
inadequate risk profiling and pricing of such innovative products in an era of over-confidence in the 
transformative efficiencies of shadow banking. Further, as the wholesale sector is intimately inter-
connected in different transactional contexts, adverse knock-on effects were able to translate into 
several rungs of morbid blows for financial institutions,48 which were inadequately foreseen and risk-
managed. Commentators are only beginning to unpack the fragilities49 caused by interconnections in 
the financial sector, whether within a group or between financial institutions.50 Hence, learning 
lessons from the global financial crisis, regulatory policy in relation to securitisation deals 
not only with the investor protection aspects of such innovative products but also the risk 
implications of such products for prudential and systemic risk regulation. 
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First, securitised products are now subject to prescriptive disclosure regimes in the pre-sale stage if 
marketed to the public.51 However, regulation has not moved away from the unregulated nature of 
the product if marketed only to sophisticated investors. In general, securities marketed to only 
sophisticated investors are exempt from prospectus regulation as sophisticated investors and issuers 
can govern their relations by contract, thus not in need of regulatory standardisation in investor 
protection. One would have thought that in the wake of the global financial crisis, which was based 
on misjudgement of novel securitised assets by the wholesale sector, that regulatory policy may be 
rethought in the area of sales of securitised products to wholesale sector sophisticated investors. 
However, the functional analysis of securitised assets has been applied to liken such products to 
securities. In securities regulation, investor protection is at its most extensive for retail investors and 
hence the reforms to the EU Prospectus Directive and Commission Regulation reflect that. However, 
the same position of exempting sophisticated investors and issuers from prospectus regulation 
remains, although problems have been highlighted in the crisis.  
We are of the view that adopting a ‘like-for-like’ approach to extending securities regulation to 
securitised products based on the existing regime seems not to have achieved much progress in 
regulatory thinking. This is in spite of securitised products being unconventional even for wholesale 
sector institutions that may not fully grasp the risks of their transactions. One may argue that as 
securitised products rely on credit ratings assigned by external credit rating agencies to appeal to 
investors, the EU regulation of credit rating agencies52 in terms of their governance and rating 
methodologies provides the relevant support for investor protection in the wholesale market. 
Further, investors may be able to sue credit rating agencies for losses caused by inaccurate ratings if 
such is a result of a gross breach of regulatory duties.53 However, such regulation is not specific to 
securitised products, and the threshold for investor litigation is relatively high. 
Nevertheless, the risk implications of such complex products were recognised and in the area of 
prudential regulation, unprecedented conservative treatment has been ushered in for securitised 
products. New policy thinking for securitised products was achieved in the realm of prudential 
regulation. The Basel Committee immediately regarded holdings of securitised assets to be in need 
of high risk weightings so that banks will be subject to appropriate capital adequacy requirements 
for holding them. A minimum floor of 25% risk weight is applied to all securitised assets with a 
maximum of 1250% applied if certain underlying information regarding the quality of such assets is 
unclear.54 The EU also introduced a mandatory 5% risk retention rule55 for originating institutions so 
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that they may be incentivised to exercise care in lending even if such loans are to be subsequently 
securitised. Risk retention is intended to ensure the maintenance of quality in securitised assets. 
Further, longer-term regulatory thinking56 is being developed in new European initiatives that intend 
to overhaul securitised products regulation and their markets. 
The functional analysis of shadow banking can usefully provide a starting point for understanding 
the economic functions and legal structures in shadow banking in order to discern if there are any 
issues with respect to the aspects of being unregulated, unmonitored and unconventional. In some 
cases, such analysis has given rise to ‘like-for-like’ treatments with equivalent existing mechanisms 
or transactions. Where that has occurred, pockets of regulatory arbitrage may be exposed, but the 
extension of regulatory perimeter may not always be apt due to finer distinguishing features. Hence, 
‘like-for-like’ approaches can be susceptible to being relatively unimaginative and lacunae in policy 
thinking continue to be observed. That said, we acknowledge that a ‘like-for-like’ approach is not 
always sub-optimal as it is useful for discerning where areas of regulatory arbitrage should be 
brought under more oversight and control. Regulatory policy thinking has not overall been so limited, 
as discussed in the examples above, but reforms such as securities financing transparency and the 
risk-weighting and risk retention of securitised assets are incremental rather than fundamental in 
nature.  In sum, we are of the view that the functional analysis of shadow banking can support a 
more comprehensive and discursive process for evaluating financial innovation, feeding into more 
thoroughly considered and perhaps innovative regulatory reform. We next discuss the origins of the 
functional approach and some of its inherent biases and limitations. We then suggest how such 
limitations and biases may be mitigated to make the functional analysis of shadow banking serve 
more optimal purposes towards financial regulatory policy. 
3. The Functional Approach and its Origins 
This Section now charts the development of the functional approach in financial regulation more 
generally. We argue that the functional approach to financial regulation was first discussed in the 
context of global movements towards restructuring financial regulatory architecture, principally in 
the adoption by many jurisdictions of a single regulator model for regulatory supervision. We 
highlight the development of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) as an example of such 
movement, and also argue that the ultimate restructuring of the FSA has not eclipsed the functional 
approach to financial regulation. In this discussion, we point out that the adoption of the functional 
approach to financial regulation is a manifestation of regulatory capitalism- a political perspective 
that embraces market capitalism and liberal approaches while at the same time supporting the 
growth of administrative structures and rules to overcome market failures, supply public goods or 
govern behaviour for public interest purposes. As such we argue that the functional approach has an 
inherent bias towards market liberalism and financial innovation that serves market needs. We will 
argue in Section 4 that such a bias needs to be overcome so that the functional approach can be 
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developed into a more robust analytical framework for evaluating financial innovation underlying 
shadow banking. 
Many commentators are of the view that the advent of the single regulator in financial services is a 
response to the changing structure of the financial sector. Although universal banking has been 
practised in much of Continental Europe, the sectoral differentiation in the US financial sector 
between banking, insurance and investment services such as brokerage, underwriting, portfolio 
management, advice etc  only began to change in the wake of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999,57 
which allowed the consolidation of banking and investment services in the US, paving the way for 
mergers and acquisitions, and the eventual growth of large banking groups58 such as JP Morgan and 
Citigroup, and the 5 large global investment banks Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. In the UK, the competitive pressures in the changed landscape 
for global financial services also pushed traditionally dominant retail banks such as Barclays and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland to grow significant investment banking operations to foray into global 
financial competition. As financial institutions increasingly became global financial supermarkets and 
one-stop shops59 for a range of financial services and products,60 financial institutions are crossing 
sectoral boundaries in their business lines and no longer operating under traditional institutional 
labels. As such, the time became ripe for considering if regulatory structures based on institutional 
lines were still fit for purpose. Further, more coherent thinking has been developing with regard to 
the overall objectives of governing finance and what public interests need to be met.61 The 
integration and consolidation of regulatory ideology in finance seemed compatible with the single 
regulatory structure. The single regulator arguably provided an attractive response to overcome 
regulatory and supervisory gaps, more closely matching the industry structure.62  
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The UK Financial Services Authority, a single regulator was set up in 200063 on the premises that it 
was well-placed to provide effective regulation in the context of changing business models in the 
financial sector. A single regulator is poised to provide efficient supervision, enjoying economies of 
scale, bird’s eye perspectives, cross-fertilisation of thinking and regulatory coherence in applying 
consistent risk-based frameworks in regulating and supervising the financial sector as a whole.64 The 
FSA adopted a functional approach to regulating financial services. This means that the regulatory 
perimeter was no longer determined according to the label of the institution concerned, such as 
being a bank, insurance or securities firm, but extended to any institution that is carrying out any of 
the activities listed in the Financial Services and Markets Act.65 Hence, an institution may carry out 
different forms of financial intermediation business but would need to be approved and supervised 
by the same regulator based on each function that falls within the scope of the regulatory perimeter. 
The FSA’s functional approach is illustrated by the FSA v Anderson66 case. The case involved the FSA 
taking enforcement action against private individuals who set up a credit intermediation business for 
a close circle of high net worth contacts. The FSA was of the view that such credit intermediation, 
based on guaranteed returns of capital and interest, amounted to deposit-taking, which is an activity 
that falls within the regulatory perimeter. As the individuals concerned were not approved by the 
FSA, the activity was prohibited. The characterisation of the activity in that case was based on a 
functional approach to understanding the economic and legal nature of the activity. 
The adoption of the functional approach meant that financial intermediation activities are not 
confined to be carried out only by ‘labelled’ incumbent institutions. In the Anderson case above, it is 
theoretically possible for the individuals to have sought FSA authorisation, and such authorisation 
may theoretically be obtained if the individuals satisfy threshold conditions for taking deposits.67 So, 
in theory, deposit-taking is not confined to deposit-taking banks under a functional approach to 
financial regulation. It may thus be argued that the adoption of a functional approach to financial 
regulation is based on market liberalism as market incumbents in the ‘sector’ can be challenged by 
entities traditionally outside of the ‘sector’ as long as regulatory approval can be obtained.  
On the one hand, a functional approach to financial regulation captures within its scope all forms of 
organisations or institutions, however rudimentary, based on the economic and legal functions of 
the activities carried out, and is therefore extensive in nature; yet on the other hand, the functional 
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approach has the potential to allow a wider scope of organisations and persons to carry out financial 
activities than traditionally thought of, and is thus liberal in nature. One point to note however is 
that the functional approach to financial regulation has not yet led to a movement of internal 
rationalisation of regulatory rules and making them consistent and coherent. The substantive rules 
have been developed over years of sectoral differentiation, giving rise to largely separate bodies of 
regulatory rules for depositary banks, insurance companies, investment in securities, collective 
investments and investment intermediation.68 
This article argues that the functional approach to financial regulation is market-liberal in character. 
It may however be argued that the functional approach has been used largely to crack down on 
innovative activities, and thus the regulator (the FSA in particular) has only used the functional 
approach in a paternalistic way, drawing into the regulatory perimeter ‘borderline’ and unregulated 
activities. This seems far from a market-liberal approach.  For example, the prohibition of the credit 
intermediation service provided in the Anderson case above would seem contrary to a market-liberal 
approach. We are of the view that the use of the functional approach to crack down on activities 
that are innovative but unregulated, has largely been confined to the retail sector. This is especially 
important, as the FSA had an express mandate for consumer protection, and was especially vigilant 
in functionally characterising retail sector financial innovation in such a way that consumer 
protection would be achieved. For example, the FSA was very vigilant in monitoring innovative 
investment schemes based on collective pooling of monies and risk, and enforcing against such 
schemes if they were unregulated, as they would need to be under Schedule 2 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. Over the years, various unregulated arrangements that may be 
perceived as ‘borderline’ have been held to fall within the regulatory perimeter for collective 
investment schemes under the Financial Services and Markets Act,69 thus requiring authorisation 
and oversight. They include purchases of real estate interests by individuals under an understanding 
that there would be a centrally managed process to secure planning and development permission 
over the plot;70 purchases of sub-lease interests in foreign real estate for the purposes of securing 
income generated by the land in terms of agricultural or carbon credit income;71 services organised 
to place horse-racing bets on behalf of subscribers;72 collective financing of a film venture;73 
collective financing to acquire patent rights.74 The above innovative schemes, many of which were 
not authorised but marketed to retail consumers, were prosecuted to closure by the FSA.  However, 
we argue that the FSA took a different and much lighter-touch approach to the wholesale financial 
sector as the relevant participants in these markets needed less top-down investor protection, and it 
is in the wholesale financial markets that much financial innovation such as securitisation and short 
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term funding based on repo paper arose.75 In such markets, unconventional, innovative but 
functionally similar financial intermediation activities have been allowed to flourish, and carveouts 
from regulatory intervention have been applied, such as the exemption from prospectus regulation 
for securities issues to sophisticated investors as mentioned above. Further, hedge and private 
equity funds were also treated as outside of the regulatory framework (for retail collective funds) as 
they catered only for sophisticated investors.76 
We argue that the functional approach to financial regulation, in the pre-crisis era, is actually 
supportive of liberal approaches to financial innovation and the development of new markets, 
especially in the wholesale sector. It is able to support the rise of alternative institutions, 
intermediation methodologies and markets, paving the way for the development of ‘bank 
disintermediation’77, a phenomenon that refers to the undertaking of innovative and alternative 
means of financial intermediation beyond that assumed by banks, therefore opening up the choice 
options of financial market participants in the wholesale sector.  The functional approach to financial 
regulation served the policy of differentiating between the wholesale and retail sectors, allowing 
market liberalism to flourish while dedicating resources to consumer protection in the retail sector. 
We argue that even though the UK has now restructured its single financial regulator into two 
regulators, the Prudential Regulation Committee under the Bank of England78 that oversees 
microprudential compliance by large banks and insurers, and the Financial Conduct Authority that 
continues to oversee consumer protection and choice, as well as market order and stability,79 the 
functional approach to financial regulation has persisted. 
Although the single regulator structure has been dismantled in the UK, many jurisdictions such as 
Germany, the Scandivanian countries, Korea etc have retained this regulatory architecture pre and 
post-global financial crisis 2007-9.80 The regulatory architecture in the UK has been partly blamed for 
not having been able to cope with certain risks in the UK financial markets that culminated in the 
banking crisis of 2008-9,81 but it is the deregulatory bias in UK financial regulation that has come 
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under fire,82 and not the functional approach to financial regulation itself. Ferran was also of the 
view that the demise of the UK FSA was due to political change rather than the ideological failure of 
integrated financial services regulation.83 The UK has now adopted a twin peaks84 approach, 
empowering the Bank of England (the PRA, or Prudential Regulation Committee) to oversee the 
safety and soundness of systematically important financial institutions such as most banks and large 
insurers, while leaving the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to deal with conduct of business 
regulation. The two bodies are dedicated to different objectives, allowing them to pursue their 
respective aims with more focus, while being compelled under legislation to coordinate in such a 
way as to maintain coherent oversight and supervision in key areas.85 In particular, the FCA still has a 
comprehensive picture of the conduct of business across all financial intermediation activity as the 
institution of the two authorities does not follow sectoral lines. Hence, the functional approach to 
financial regulation has not been departed from but arguably refined, as (a) the regulatory 
jurisdiction of the PRA is based on the risk profile generated by the economic and legal functions of 
financial intermediation activities and (b) the formal coordination apparatus for the PRA and FCA 
ensures that a form of integrated supervision (which is rooted in the functional perspective of 
financial services) remains important. 
Having now sketched the nature of the functional approach in financial regulation, the next Section 
argues that there are two limitations inherent in the functional approach. First, the roots of the 
functional approach in market liberalism may obscure certain possibilities in regulatory policy 
thinking. Second, the functional approach has been used too readily in favour of the presumption 
towards a ‘like-for-like’ approach in regulatory thinking, thus limiting thorough and innovative 
regulatory policy solutions. Third, the function approach in financial regulation has been used to 
favour deregulation for the wholesale sector leading up to the crisis, and is still susceptible to 
arguments in legal arbitrage that influence regulatory policy-making. 
4. Limitations of the Functional Approach 
First, we argue that the functional approach to shadow banking is fundamentally rooted in market 
liberalism. A market-liberal paradigm accepts as legitimate the economic functions that various 
shadow banking mechanisms serve as meeting supply and demand needs. The social utility of such 
mechanisms are seldom critically questioned.  
Although the functional approach to shadow banking frames shadow banking activities in terms of 
their economic functions and the nature of the demand that gives rise to such activities, the 
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approach does not arguably take us further beyond accepting such demand as legitimate.86 In other 
words, as long as the demand and supply are a demonstration of the working of market forces, the 
micro-economic behaviour is not subject to further critical inquiry as to its social utility. For example, 
the EU’s adoption of the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation demonstrates that policy-
makers accept the necessity of the repo markets, and therefore aim to provide an environment for 
such markets to be conducted with more confidence by participants. More fundamental questions 
are not raised about the normative desirability of such short term funding, and whether it is ideal for 
such markets to be constituted upon private legal structures. Indeed the functional approach may 
achieve the effect of ‘normalising’ or ‘mainstreaming’ shadow banking activities in due course. The 
functional analysis of shadow banking activities is inherently biased towards providing justification 
for such activities as long as the economic function of the activities can be clarified, therefore 
mitigating the exotic and unconventional perspectives related to such activities, lending support for 
such activities to be treated as regular.87 The regularisation of such shadow banking activity can be 
achieved by the reduction of its unregulated or unmonitored nature, by extending some form of 
regulatory perimeter over it. In this way, the market-liberal bias in the functional approach frames 
the role of regulation as a legitimising tool- regularising shadow banking activity through regulatory 
capitalism.  
Further, we are also of the view that the market-liberal bias in the functional approach shapes 
regulatory policy in the process of informing it. The resulting regulatory policy is generally 
incremental in nature rather than representing fundamental change. The mandatory transparency in 
relation to collateral in the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation is an example of such 
incremental regulatory policy that seeks not to be too intrusive for the markets, as market 
participants are still relatively free to conduct their activities as long as the required transparency is 
provided. We are of the view that the market-liberal bias in the functional approach to 
understanding shadow banking is likely to result in regulatory policy that is pro-market and 
facilitative in nature. The danger is that such regulatory policy could subsequently be discovered to 
be inadequate, needing intrusive corrective actions in due course. An example would be the 
extensive regulation of over-the-counter derivatives markets88 after decades of self-regulation 
ended in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-9. 
Moreover, incremental regulatory policy that is pro-market will entail an expansion of the list of 
legitimate risks that financial institutions can undertake. This could inadvertently bolster their 
systemic risk profile and the necessity of the public sector backstop for them. This is not an 
unfamiliar phenomenon as it has happened before- in the mainstreaming of universal banking in the 
US by the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act. In spite of the Glass-Steagall restrictions, the US 
financial sector has developed over many years shadow banking solutions to avoid the restrictions, 
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and hence the abolition of the restrictions merely reflected the needs of market forces.  However, 
the abolition has allowed universal banking to grow more legitimately and explosively in the US, 
greatly increasing the systemic risk profile of very large global banking institutions.89  
Indeed some commentators who have applied a functional analysis to study shadow banking argue 
that many aspects of shadow banking need the equivalent of established backstops for existing 
financial intermediation mechanisms. They suggest how backstops may be extended accordingly.90 It 
is at this point we should question the market-liberal bias in functionally recognising the legitimacy 
of the shadow banking activity- is it right to assume that society as a whole should support such 
extension of backstops, effectively extending its social contract with depositary banks to shadow 
banking entities? 
However, it could be argued that the market-liberal bias in functionally recognising the legitimacy of 
shadow banking activity is consistent with the social benefits of market choice and with EU policy in 
market integration. ‘Normalising’ shadow banking activities and placing them on an even level-
playing field as mainstream regulated financial intermediation means that they can be more 
appropriately priced and openly offered in the markets, while being subject to an extent of 
regulation and supervision.91  
Further, it is likely the incremental nature of regulatory policy discussed above would draw heavily 
upon a “like-for-like” approach in functionally equivalent existing regulation.  This is because a ‘like-
for-like’ approach derives from an existing regime and is less likely to give rise to controversy. 
Further, a ‘like-for-like’ approach is favoured by the EU, as the European Commission supports 
achieving consistent regulation in similar issue areas across similar financial intermediation. This 
approach has already been taken in the imposition of consistent European remuneration regulation 
across banks, investment firms, mutual and alternative (hedge and private equity) funds,92  and 
conduct of business regulation for the purposes of investor protection (such as in transparency, 
communications or acting in the best interests of investors).  
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We argue that a ‘like-for-like’ approach in regulatory policy is not always optimal, as it can in some 
cases result in over-extension of the regulatory perimeter where not necessarily warranted; or 
under-inclusion. Under-inclusion is a likely phenomenon if the ‘like-for-like’ extension results in 
significant regulatory burdens, and lobbyists mount arguments in legal arbitrage to challenge the 
‘like-for-like’ comparisons. Such is the case regarding asset managers who have resisted systemic 
risk regulation being extended to them,93 although they are increasingly conducting a range of 
financial intermediation activities that give them enormous power with savers and the markets. We 
argue that the functional analysis should not be immediately applied in ‘like for like’ comparisons to 
inform regulatory policy. It should instead be framed in a more open and discursive manner so that 
more discourse on evaluating financial innovation can be stimulated, and can subsequently feed into 
more holistic policy thinking about shadow banking, mitigating the market liberal bias inherent in 
the functional approach. 
Where EU policy-making is concerned, a number of over-extended regulatory areas have been 
observed, as seeking regulatory convergence may result in over-inclusive regulatory regimes that are 
not always appropriate. For example, why should hedge and private equity managers’ remuneration, 
which is heavily subject to arms-length contractual scrutiny, be regulated in accordance with the 
same prudential concerns that affect banks that have a large retail footprint?94 Further, Payne has 
also criticised the indiscriminating treatment of hedge and private equity funds in the EU Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive 2011.95 Further, the drive for regulatory consistency is likely to 
increase regulatory cost across the board and make financial services more expensive to access. At 
worst, extensive and over-inclusive regulatory regimes could cause financial services to become so 
costly or inaccessible that gives rise to financial repression and the migration of shadow activity to 
further unregulated channels.96 
It may be argued that an apt price has to be paid for a better regulated financial services sector 
where regulatory arbitrage and the false sense of cost-effectiveness are reduced.97 Further, as 
financial regulation has moved towards more precautionary applications,98 it could be argued that a 
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“like-for-like” extension of regulatory perimeter may mitigate future problems.99 One such example 
is in the large exposures reforms carried out in the EU100 and by the Basel Committee.101 This regime 
deals with capping banks’ exposures to a single or connected group of institutions in proportion to 
banks’ equity capital position, so that such exposures would not result in failure risk for the bank if a 
counter-party should fail. The Basel Committee has proposed relatively conservative thresholds for 
the cap, for large exposures to be limited to no more than 15% of the bank’s own funds. The EU now 
counts exposures to shadow banking entities as being caught by the definition of large exposures, 
and applies a wide definition of connected institutions to limit concentrations of credit risk. As the 
scope of shadow banking entities is widely defined, the “like-for-like” analysis underlying the 
extensive application of the large exposures regime has closed gaps in the regulatory net. 
Turning to under-inclusion, such is usually underpinned by regulatory arbitrage and powerful 
lobbying, which can indeed be supported by the functional analysis too. Where functional 
equivalencies between financial activities are rationalised at a rather high level, for example the 
money creation function of the repo market for short term funding and the money creation function 
undertaken by banks based on deposit-taking, we may argue that the same microprudential 
regulation that applies to bank lending on the basis of deposits should apply to money market 
lending on the basis of collateral. But as differences in the legal structures of the market are fleshed 
out, it may be argued that the high-level ‘like for like’ comparison is misleading. In the repo market, 
the laws of property and security rights operate and so counterparties are more protected than 
unsecured depositor/creditors. One can argue therefore that the confidence and stability 
mechanisms needed are different in such markets, for example such markets need a sufficient 
supply of safe assets to use as collateral,102 and perhaps a framework to ensure that collateral 
remains valuable in its use and re-use. Such needs are different from the needs of unsecured 
depositors. Where the ‘like-for-like’ application of regulatory policy becomes no longer persuasive, it 
is possible for regulatory thinking to be developed in a completely novel manner, or regulatory 
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policy may settle for the minimal and uncontroversial. The latter approach has arguably taken in the 
European Securities Financing Transactions Regulation 2015. 
The functional analysis of shadow banking can give rise to the teasing out of different legal and 
economic structures, and therefore the distinguishing of shadow banking activities from similar but 
regulated activities. This may entail the development of specific rules and regimes for distinct 
shadow banking activities, tending towards being narrow in scope, and perhaps even substantively 
undisruptive to existing practices. In such a landscape, although regulation may continue to develop 
specifically to catch up with the distinguishing features of various activities, which is a tenet of 
regulatory capitalism as discussed earlier, such regulation may nevertheless develop in pockets and 
incrementally, leaving new gaps where regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation could occur. We 
observe that although the Financial Stability Board has a general interest in shadow banking,103 its 
recommendations have inevitably boiled down to specific and distinct activities, shaping special 
regulatory regimes for rather specific activities such as money market funds and securities 
financing.104 In this way, although the functional approach may promise of inclusivity in thinking 
about shadow banking, regulatory implementation may be dogged by lobbying and legal arbitrage 
and therefore become more specific and arguably under-inclusive.  
Most importantly however, we are of the view that the functional approach to studying shadow 
banking, which is inherently biased towards market liberalism, and perhaps places too much faith in 
a form of regulatory capitalism that is incremental instead of fundamental, would inevitably shut out 
normative and critical queries in relation to the desirability and social utility of shadow banking 
activities. For example, even if shadow banking activities perform liquidity transformation on a larger 
scale than existed in markets before, is such liquidity an unequivocal good? Is the chasing of ever 
more liquidity and even hyper-liquidity in speedy trading environments a desirable phenomenon?105 
Or as Blair106 insightfully suggested, shadow banking activities are often aimed to increase the level 
of leverage in the financial sector and real economy, but is credit creation an unequivocal good?  We 
will further extrapolate this argument in relation to the specific example of securitisation below. 
In the US, securitisation has made voluminous mortgage lending possible, and the expansive growth 
of home loans is regarded as a legitimate economic activity, supported by the policy of encouraging 
home ownership. The demand for home loans, giving rise to financial innovation that facilitates ever 
more such lending is not questioned.107 Securitisation transactionalises and changes the nature of 
long-term relationships in residential mortgage lending, and therefore affects underwriting 
                                                          
103
 FSB, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015 (Nov 2015). 
104
 FSB, ‘Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Overview of Policy Recommendations’ 
(2013); FSB, Transforming Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-based Finance (12 Nov 2015). 
105
 John Kay, ‘A fixation on liquidity is not healthy for financial markets’, Financial Times (17 Sep 2013). 
106
 Margaret M Blair, ‘Making Money: Leverage and Private Sector Money Creation’ (2013) 36 Seattle 
University Law Review 417. 
107
 Arnoud W A Boot and Anjan V Thakor, ‘Commercial Banking and Shadow Banking: The Accelerating 
Integration of Banks and Markets and its Implications for Regulation’ (2013) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2318623. 
standards and investor protection.  Although long-term credit transactions create illiquidity for 
banks that keep these assets in its books, can securitisation really transform the nature of such 
relational and illiquid assets into investible and more liquid assets on investment markets? 
Investment markets require much more standardisation and genericity to generate a trading 
environment i.e. liquidity for investors with varying time horizons, from short to long term. How 
would such marketisation affect the nature of the long-term underwriting and its relational 
dimension? As the collapse of mortgaged-backed securities and their complex versions such as 
collaterised debt obligations has shown in the global financial crisis, the financial alchemy is only 
incompletely achieved108-  the markets were ultimately unsure of the underlying characteristics that 
would sustain the liquidity of such products.  Hence, did securitisation and marketisation of long-
term illiquid products only produce a temporary and false bubbly market that led to overdrive in the 
real economy?  
Fundamentally, the normative question as to the appropriateness of marketising essentially long-
term relationship products is not asked. Financial innovation may meet the needs of market demand, 
but if such financial innovation merely capitalises on greed to meet immediate market demand in a 
way that is ultimately unsustainable, a normative query on the nature of such innovation ought to 
be raised.109 Further, the nature of market demand for home ownership should also perhaps be 
questioned. The functional approach to understanding securitisation has not produced a fruitful 
conversation on normative aspects such as the dilemmas between the demand for home ownership 
and issues of consumer affordability and financial literacy,110 the question of whether residential real 
estate is being overly commoditised and effects on asset price inflation.111 As a matter of economic 
policy, universal home ownership is not pursued as a matter of course everywhere. Many 
Continental European countries such as France and Germany pursue policies that ensure affordable 
rental housing and adequate tenant protection, and treat home ownership in a more nuanced 
manner.112 At a broader level, policy questions should be asked as to the desirability and contrary 
implications for encouraging home ownership. 
Asking the normative questions above also help us to forge a constructive conversation in where 
securitisation may play a viable role for needs in the real economy. Perhaps asset classes that are 
shorter term in duration may make better securitised products, and perhaps greater standardisation 
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can be achieved to provide adequate comfort for investors.  The EU is pushing for a rejuvenation of 
the securitised products market where such products are highly standardised and transparent.113  
Such policy is based on expanding the financing options for small and medium-sized enterprises and 
nascent conversations are only beginning to take place on the objectives of real economy financing, 
and the different channels that can be involved in such intermediation in a manner that is 
sustainable and responsible. 
This Section has suggested that although the functional approach overcomes regulatory 
fragmentation in studying the nature of shadow banking activities, one needs to beware of the 
market liberalism bias inherent in the approach which may obscure the raising of more fundamental 
and critical questions in relation to the nature of demand and supply of financial innovation. This 
may result in the design of minimal regulatory policies that are pro-market and arguably under-
inclusive in regulating and supervising expansions in institutional and market risk. Further, the 
functional analysis of shadow banking could also result in an application of “like-for-like” regulatory 
policy which may be unnecessarily over-inclusive and precludes more imaginative thinking about 
regulatory solutions. The next Section therefore makes some suggestions as to the optimal 
application of the functional approach in regulatory policy-making. 
5. The Optimalities of the Functional Approach and Conclusion 
We have argued that the functional approach to understanding shadow banking overcomes 
conventional analysis limited by fragmented regulatory frameworks based on sectoral differentiation, 
and is able to provide an account of economic objectives and risks associated with shadow banking 
activities. We however warn that this approach may be inherently biased towards market liberalism 
and should not be used to preclude normative queries regarding the social utility of certain financial 
activities. We are also of the view that regulatory policy-makers have used this approach in a “like-
for-like” application of existing regulation in many areas, which is not always optimal. 
We argue that the above limitations of the functional approach can be overcome by a deliberate 
channelling of the functional approach into a rational communicative framework that is inclusive, so 
that financial innovation and its merits can be fully debated upon, to feed into regulatory policy-
making. Such a rational communicative framework would ensure that a wide range of stakeholders 
can provide a voice in the financial regulatory policy process, which has hitherto been dominated by 
the financial sector and policy-making elites in the national and international spheres.114 
                                                          
113
 European Commission, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
laying down common rules on securitisation and creating a European framework for simple, transparent and 
standardised securitisation and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and Regulations 
(EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012 (Sep 2015) and background in European Commission, Action Plan on 
Building a Capital Markets Union (30 Sep 2015) at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-
union/docs/building-cmu-action-plan_en.pdf. 
114
 See chapter 3, Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford: 
Routledge 2014) and extensive citations therein. 
Such a rational communicative framework can be built upon the work of Jürgen Habermas.115  
Habermas was of the view that a utopian democracy is based on human communication and 
discourse that is achieved at an objective, truthful and rational level. Therefore, Habermasian 
discourse is built upon the sharing of facts, the rational communication of knowledge without bias of 
political or partisan position, and inclusive discourse which results in a mutual understanding and 
achievement of consensus. 
The functional approach to understanding shadow banking is intended to achieve fact-finding in 
understanding shadow banking activities, their economic functions and legal structures. Such 
analysis can be undertaken in a neutral and objective manner, seeking to foster a body of knowledge. 
We argue that such a body of knowledge should be fostered independent of power domination, 
interest preferences, and arguments rooted in national legal structures. Such a body of knowledge 
should be placed on a transnational platform and be accessible to all. It should form the basis for 
inclusive and imaginative discourse, opening up for all aspects of discussion relation to fundamental 
objectives and purposes of shadow banking activities, such as: inclusiveness and exclusiveness in 
such activities; what benefits entail and who enjoys them; what risks entail and who bears them; 
what aspects of private law apply and whose interests are protected; what aspects of regulatory law 
apply and whose interests are protected; and what changes in any of the above are needed. This 
discourse is necessary for us to evaluate the nature and development of financial innovation 
underlying shadow banking so that a mutual understanding can be reached in terms of achieving a 
democratic social response to determining the desirability of such innovation. The communicative 
framework for shadow banking would prevent a discourse on financial innovation from being 
artificially prevented or circumscribed by financial sector elites. It would also form a more robust 
basis for regulatory policy, so that regulatory thinking is not confined to existing structures and 
parameters, and can be more thorough, well-founded and imaginative. 
One commentator116 observes that the conversation between economy and society has become 
disengaged in the era of neo-classical and laissez-faire markets. Such disengagement has led to 
narrow-minded perspectives of economic activities, markets and objectives, such as the ‘rational 
economic man’, over-reliance on market competition as a governance mechanism and on private 
and not regulatory law. The rejuvenation of such a conversation would be in line with the Polanyian 
vision of social embedment of markets and the economy.117  In this light, using the functional 
approach to understanding shadow banking can be constructed as part of the broader context of 
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economy-society interaction and conversation, ushering in a more inclusive and more informed form 
of capitalism, ameliorating the adverse effects associated with finance capitalism.118 Further, 
Decker119 observes that the limitations of neo-classical economic models have been revealed over 
the years as being narrowly focused and excessively insular. Hence, the rise of theories in economic 
justice, distribution and of behavioural economics for example shows how the social is necessarily 
re-embedded in the economy and markets.  
It may be argued that the objectivity in constructing such a Habermasian economy-society 
conversation on shadow banking cannot be perfectly achieved, as we need to use economic and 
legal frameworks to constitute the knowledge relating to shadow banking.  Hence, Law or Economics 
as a body of established ideas and perspectives could be used to distort the communication. Further, 
it may be argued that a communicative framework is not possible as it assumes all participants are 
equal. It may be argued that shadow banking issues only affect wholesale sector users and 
macroprudential regulators, and so why should others be allowed to shape regulatory policy-making 
in this area? Further, the level of sophistication required for understanding shadow banking is not 
compatible with the average level of education and financial literacy in the general demographics, of 
even developed countries.  It may also be argued that ignoring differences in national legal 
structures in constructing a Habermasian discourse is wrong, as that artificially assumes that 
individual jurisdictions have not already made certain political, economic or social choices in respect 
of how rights ought to be governed. The transnational level of the Habermasian discourse may be 
used to subvert the democratic choices already made in individual jurisdictions. 
The rational communicative framework as part of the re-engagement of economy-society 
conversations may be an ideal that is impracticable, or ironically prone to tyranny. This does not 
however mean that we cannot start by using the functional analysis of shadow banking in such a way 
as to contribute to such a re-engagement with a wider social landscape, in phases or stages. The 
market liberal bias in the functional analysis can be questioned in the rational communicative 
framework, so that contrary voices may provide constructive and alternative views to the normative 
desirability of certain financial innovations. Mainstream citizenry, such as the Occupy movement,120 
arose briefly to reflect social interest in engaging with fundamental social discourse on finance, and 
should not be shut out by the use of jargon. Such discussions can be important for regulatory policy-
making for example, in prohibiting certain products or services altogether or in more boldly 
proscribing their scope. Regulation has not made negative substantive judgments on financial 
innovation so far, even if procedural regulation may be used to manage risks, such as the Volcker 
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rule in the US121 and ring-fencing legislation in the UK.122 We think there may be such a role for 
regulation.123 We also think a communicative framework for the functional understanding of shadow 
banking opens up more imaginative possibilities in regulatory policy, and makes us less confined to 
“like for like” applications of existing regulatory paradigms.  
As the global financial crisis has made us more socially aware of financial sector risks and their 
impact, it is timely to build such a communicative framework, to embrace the ‘cosmopolitan 
moment’ as described by Beck.124  It is noted that the Bank of England, a traditionally closed 
organisation has started Open Forums125 to lead and invite open discussions by participants in all 
walks of life. Such are examples of the first steps towards a more systematic and deliberate 
institution of a rational communicative framework. Presumptions that regulatory policy-making in 
the wholesale financial sector is confined to participants in the sector and should not enrol other 
citizens’ opinions are merely elitist and insular in nature. At a transnational level, the Financial 
Stability Board is poised to lead such a direction although it is at the moment behaving more like a 
closed think-tank of technocratic elites. Perhaps its global surveillance in shadow banking will place 
it in a position to reach out for wider discourse.   
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